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NOTES
IN NEED OF ENLIGHTENMENT: THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION'S MISGUIDED ANALYSIS IN SUNSET
REVIEWS
The United States is no different than most modern nations that
trade products in the international marketplace. That is to say, as
a result of its participation in the international trade arena, the
United States has an extensive body of laws to regulate its trade
with foreign nations.1 The purpose of trade regulation varies
depending upon an individual's philosophic persuasion. One indi-
vidual may view trade regulation as a synonym for protectionism in
which trade with other nations is discouraged, while another may
interpret trade regulation as a means to protect domestically
manufactured goods from unfair competition. Regardless of one's
opinion on the need for trade regulation, its omnipresence in today's
international marketplace demands careful analysis.
Trade regulation is not a recent phenomenon, but rather a resil-
ient force whose indiscrete character morphs over time, evolving
with changes in the global economy.2 In the present era, in which
1. Michael Y. Chung, U.S. Antidumping Laws: A Look at the New Legislation, 20 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 495, 495-96 n.5 (1995) (identifying various trade remedies that are
available to U.S. domestic producers). Such alternative trade regulations include Executive
Orders to temporarily restrict imports; exclusion orders to prevent the importation of
products that infringe a U.S. patent, copyright, or trademark; and relief for employees
harmed by unfair competition from imports.
2. Jagdish Bhagwati, International Trade Issues for the 90s, 8 B.U. INt L.J. 199, 199
(1990) (analogizing protectionism to a cockroach, because both are "indestructible," and
describing how protectionism evolves through the emergence of new forms of trade barriers).
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) 3 takes center
stage, nontariff barriers (NTBs)4 have replaced tariffs' as the
favored mechanism of trade regulation.6 According to one commen-
tator, "[tiariffs no longer matter in international trade law ...
Nontariff barriers are what matter in late twentieth and early
twenty-first century international trade law, leaving protectionists
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. "[GATT ] is the fountainhead ofinternational trade law."
RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO SYSTEM, REGIONAL
ARRANGEMENT,ANDU.S. LAW § 1, at 1 (1998)). In October 1947, twenty-three nations signed
GATT for the purpose of liberalizing trade. Id. at 5. "The principal goal of GATT was to
establish limitation on tariffs and to control the use of certain non-tariff barriers to trade."
JOHN H. JACKSON ETAL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OFINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALSAND TEXT ON THE NATIONALAND INTERNATIONALREGUIATIONOFTRANSNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 5 (3d ed. 1995). To achieve the stated goals of reducing tarifflevels and
nontariff barriers on a global basis, GATT members participate in what are known as
multilateraltrade "negotiation rounds." BHALA&KENNEDY, supra, § 2, at 5-6. To date, GATT
has sponsored a total of eight rounds, including the Uruguay Round, the most recent
negotiation round concluded in 1994. Id.
4. Nontariff barriers are trade restraints other than tariffs, such as quotas and
subsidies. See JACKSONETAL., supra note 3, § 8.1, at 376-78. Indicative of the diverse nature
of NTBs, a cataloguing effort that began in the 1960s identified over 800 distinct NTBs. Id.
at 377. Despite the diversity of NTBs, most can be categorized under one of the following
general headings: customs valuation, subsidies, import licensing rules, quality standards,
health and safety regulations, labeling laws, investment performance requirements, rules
restricting government procurement to domestic producers and testing requirements, and
lack of intellectual property protection. Id. at 378.
5. A tariff is akin to a tax that is imposed on imported goods before they are allowed to
enter domestic commerce. Id. at 377. With respect to the current trend towards trade
liberalization, "[t]arrifs ... are the only form of trade protection that the GATT-WTO system
does not'specifically prohibit." BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 1-3(a), at 78. Although
GATT permits members to impose tariffs, it also legally binds members to their reciprocal
commitments to reduce overall tariff levels. Id. § 1(c), at 4. Those who favor trade
liberalization generallyprefer tariffs to NTBs because tariffs are relatively more transparent
than NTBs. JACKSON ETAL., supra note 3, § 8.1, at 377. Compared to NTBs, such as quotas
and subsidies, tariffs "are more visible, capture for the government much of the 'monopoly
profit' which they create, do not need licensing to administer, do not require government
funds (in contrast to a subsidy), and give only a limited amount of protection ... ."Id- From
a GATT perspective, tariffs are clearly preferred because it is easier to negotiate reductions
in tariffs than for NTBs. Id.
6. Those who oppose trade liberalization prefer NTBs to tariffs because, under GATT,
members are bound to certain tariff commitments and thus cannot protect domestic goods
by increasing tariffs. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 1(c), at 4; see also JACKSON ETAL.,
supra note 3, § 8.1, at 376-78; Bhagwati, supra note 2, at 199. Alternatively, certain NTBs
are not prohibited by GATT and thus afford members the means to effectuate their desired
degree of protectionism. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 2, at 5-7.
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with few remaining weapons to achieve their goals."7 As quickly as
nations agree to reduce certain barriers to trade, new forms of
NTBs emerge to perpetuate the practice of protectionism.8 Included
among the protectionist's arsenal of NTB "weapons" are anti-
dumping and countervailing duty laws. Since the 1980s these
laws have been the U.S. "weapon of choice" to protect domestic
industries.9
Nations justify the existence of antidumping and countervailing
duty laws as a means to counterbalance the "unfair" trade practices
of dumping0 and subsidization." In the United States, counter-
7. Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 1, 3
(1995). NTBs predate the creation of the GATT system. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, §
2, at 5-7. It was only after the creation of the GATT system and the subsequent reduction in
tariff levels and reliance on quotas, however, that NTBs operated to the detriment of trade
liberalization. Id. Prior to 1947, "[NTBs] had no adverse effect on trade flows because tariff
levels were so high that many imported goods could not clear the tariff wall in the first
place." Id. at 6. In the GATT-WTO system, however, NTBs largely replaced tariffs as the
preferred means for nations to protect weak domestic industries and their economies during
periods of economic hardship. Id. at 5-7.
8. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 3, § 8.1, at 377 (commenting that the elimination of
certain trade barriers invariably leads to the creation of other restraints to achieve the same
purpose). "The discovery of new protective devices appears to be an endless process. As soon
as the international system establishes restraints or regulations on a particular protective
device, government officials and human ingenuity seem able to turn up some other measures
to accomplish at least part of their protective purposes." Id.
9. Bhala, supra note 7, at 3-5 (claiming that antidumping laws have been the United
States' "weapon of choice" since the 1980s).
10. Dumping occurs when an exporter sells goods in the importing country at less than
fair market value (LTFV), or at a much lowerprice than in its country of origin. Bhala, supra
note 7, at 8-9. Under U.S. domestic law, "dumping' refer[s] to the sale or likely sale of goods
at less than fair value." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2000). For purposes of comparison, the
Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement provides that dumping occurs when "'products of
one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal
value of the products....'" BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 6-1(a), at 650 (quoting GATT
art. VI:1). Alternatively, commentators often refer to dumping as "international price
discrimination." Id. at 649 n.1.
11. The economic concept of a subsidy is a "benefit conferred on a firm or product by
action of a government." BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 7-1(a), at 767 (citing JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 261 (1989)). Bhala and Kennedy disfavor the
economic concept of a subsidy because its scope is too broad and thus not very useful in
understanding the application of countervailing duty law. Id. In the context of U.S. domestic
laws, countervailing duties are imposed only on"countervailable subsidies'which existwhen
"an authority (i) provides a financial contribution, (ii) provides any form of income or price
support within the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994, or (iii) makes a payment to a
funding mechanism to provide a financial contribution.., to a person'and a benefit is thereby
conferred." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B).
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vailing duties (CVDs) are imposed to compensate for subsidies
received by foreign producers, and antidumping duties (ADs) are
imposed to compensate for the sale of imported products at less
than their fair market value.' Historically, AD and CVD orders
established by the United States tended to endure without any
scheduled termination. 3 At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
in 1994,"4 however, the United States amended its trade laws to
include a mandatory review mechanism for AD and CVD orders,
known as a "sunset review.""s
According to one commentator, "The [Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act] fundamentally changed the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty section of the amended United States Tariff Act of 1930
..... 1The sunset review provision, however, has not yet led to a
widespread discontinuation of AD and CVD orders.' In this regard,
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (imposing countervailing duties); id. § 1673 (imposing antidumping
duties).
13. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-1, at 492-93. Once an AD or CVD order is
issued, "[it] remains in place, and a duty is collected, for an indefinite period, though it is
subject to administrative, changed circumstances, and sunset reviews." Id. Under U.S. law
prior to the adoption of sunset reviews, antidumping orders could remain in effect as long as
an import was found to cause injury to a domestic industry. See TRACY MURRAY, The
Administration of the Antidumping Duty Law by the Department of Commerce, in DOWN IN
THE DUMPS: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAiR TRADE LAWS 54-56 (Richard Boltuck & Robert
E. Liton eds., 1991).
14. The Uruguay Round was the most recent round of multilateral trade negotiations of
GATT. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 4, at 8-9. One of the most significant outcomes of
the Uruguay Round was the creation of the World Trade Organization. Id. To lend
perspective to the importance of the Uruguay Round, it has been described as "the most far-
reaching and comprehensive development in world trade since 1947 .... Id. at 8.
15. See infra notes 71-86 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the sunset
review provision. The implementing legislation is known as the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.) [hereinafter URAA].
16. Peter A. Dohman, Determination of Adequacy in Sunset Reviews of Antidumping
Orders in the United States, 14 AM. U. INTVL. L. REv. 1281, 1287 (1999).
17. From July 1998 (when sunset reviews of AD and CVD orders in existence as of
January 1, 1995 began) to March 2002, 351 sunset reviews were instituted. See Intl Trade
Comm'n, Five-Year Review Status (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http:J/205.197.120.60/oinv/
sunset.nsf. As of March 5, 2002, the ITC has made determinations with respect to 271 of
these 351 sunset reviews. Id. Eighty-eight reviews were revoked by the Commerce
Department due to the lack of response by U.S. domestic producers and two reviews were
pending before the ITC. Id.; see infra note 79 (discussing mandatory revocation of an order
upon the failure of any interested domestic party to respond to the notice of initiation of a
sunset review). Of the 271 sunset reviews submitted to the International Trade Commission
(ITC), the ITC made a determination to revoke orders in a mere thirty-two percent of the
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those who originally envisioned the sunset review as a means to
dramatically reduce trade barriers to the U.S. market may well be
disappointed. The question, therefore, remains whether the failure
of the ITC to revoke a substantial number of AD and/or CVD orders
is attributable to either (a) the failure of the URAA to bring
about significant substantive changes in the domestic AD and CVD
laws or (b) the misinterpretation of the legal standards to be
applied during sunset reviews by the Department of Commerce
(Commerce), the International Trade Commission (ITC), or both.
This Note analyzes the domestic administrative processes
used to establish AD and CVD orders and critiques the review
mechanism that can lead to removal of these orders. Essentially,
this Note examines the legal standards applied during sunset
reviews and concludes that the ITC's interpretation of these
standards is misguided and fails to honor the legislative intent
underlying sunset reviews."'
Using the sunset reviews of AD and CVD orders in Magnesium
from Canada19 as a case example, this Note suggests that the
standards of review applied by the ITC in sunset reviews are flawed
in three respects. First, the ITC erroneously engaged in prospective
analysis of future production volumes of a new Canadian company,
reviews. See Int'l Trade Comm'n, supra. In sixty-eight percent of the sunset reviews, the ITC
has made a determination not to revoke AD or CVD orders. I&L Although a total of 157
determinations to revoke orders have been made in sunset reviews, eighty-eight of those
revocations were due to the lack ofresponse from the U.S. domestic industry. Id. Thus, fewer
than half of the actual revocations of orders are attributable to the administrative reviews
of the ITC.
18. BHALA & KENNEDY, suprdnote 3, § 5-10(c), at 635 (identifying the revocation of stale
AD and CVD orders as the key purpose of sunset reviews). For a discussion of the legislative
intent underlying the inclusion of the sunset review in the agreements that emerged from
the Uruguay Round, see infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
19. Magnesium from Canada, 65 Fed. Reg. 47,517 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2000)
(determination). The text of the ITC determination is contained in INTL TRADE COMM'N,
MAGNESIUMFROM CANADA: INVESTIGATIONSNOS. 701-TA-309-A-B AND 731-TA-528 (REvIEw)
(2000) (USITC Pub. No. 3324) [hereinafter MAGNESIUM], available at http://www.usitc.gov/
wais/reportstarc/w3324.htm. Magnesium is the lightest of all structural metals and is highly
abundant. MAGNESIUM, supra, at 6. Given magnesium's structural integrity, its abundance,
and the strict emissions standards for automobiles, it is highly valued by automobile
manufacturers who envision replacing aluminum with magnesium to manufacture the main
components of cars and trucks, especially sport utility vehicles (SUVs). See, e.g., Jeffrey Ball,
Ford, Breaking Ranks with Rivals, Plans to Boost Fuel Economy of Its SUV.Fleet, WALL ST.
J., July 27, 2000, atA2.
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Magnola. In its calculation of the potential volume of magnesium
imports from Canada, as part of its material injury analysis, the
ITC included the manufacturing capacity of Magnola despite the
fact that it had not yet begun to produce magnesium in commercial
quantities.0 This Note evaluates how the ITC's inclusion of statis-
tics from a prospective entrant in its analysis defeats the legislative
intent of the sunset review mechanism.
Second, in its material injury determination, the ITC failed to
fully appreciate the proper causation standard. The ITC's failure
to distinguish between the harm to the domestic industry caused
by Canadian imports and harm caused by nonsubject imports
invalidates its determination that injury to the U.S. domestic
industry would likely continue.2
Third, the ITC failed to properly apply the theory of "captive
production,"22 a term that refers to the process in which a sub-
sidiary produces an input that is consumed, either by another
subsidiary or by the parent company, in the manufacture of a
downstream product.' The production of such inputs is said to be
"captive" because it fulfills an internal manufacturing need. By
definition, captively produced goods are not sold in the merchant
market2 but rather are consumed internally' by the manufacturer.
The premise underlying the theory of "captive production" is
that imported goods do not compete with internally consumed
products.26 Ultimately, if the imports do not compete with captively
consumed products in the merchant market then, by definition, the
portion of domestic production that is consumed internally cannot
20. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
21. See MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 12.
22. See infra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
23. Instead of purchasing all the inputs needed to manufacture a product from external
suppliers, companies often establish facilities to manufacture such inputs.
24. "Merchant market" is a general term used to describe business-to-business
transactions.
25. A product is "internally consumed" if it is incorporated into another product before
being sold.
26. See MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 12 n.76.
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be injured2 by the imports, regardless of whether the imports are
subsidized or dumped.
In the sunset review involving Canadian magnesium, despite the
internal consumption of a large percentage of U.S. produced
magnesium, 2 the ITC found that the U.S. magnesium industry was
materially injured by the Canadian imports. 29 This Note examines
the legal reasoning employed by the ITC to justify its apparent
disregard for the domestically produced magnesium that was
captively consumed.
The ITC's expansive construction of the statutory language
establishing sunset reviews eliminates any notion of predictability
or consistency in its determinations and defeats the intended
objectives of the provision. Ultimately, the standards of review
must be clarified in order for the United States to achieve the
outcomes Congress intended in adopting the URAA and to meet its
obligations under international law as established in the Uruguay
Round negotiations.
The first section of this Note provides background on a case that
will be analyzed throughout the Note by explaining the importance
of magnesium. 0 The second section explains the basic theoretical
principles of subsidization and dumping and how such practices
injure domestic markets.31 The third section provides a statutory
and factual overview of U.S. AD and CVD laws that are designed to
counterbalance the effects of dumping and subsidization, with an
emphasis on the processes by which AD and CVD orders can be
established and removed.32 The fourth section examines the 1994
27. Material injury or threat of material injury is one of the determinations required
under the statute before AD or CVD orders can be imposed. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) (2000)
(imposing countervailing duty orders); id. § 1673a(a) (imposing antidumping duty orders);
see also infra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
28. The exact percentage has not been publically disclosed due to the Administrative
Protective Order (APO) concerning such company-specific information. The ITC recognizes
that both of the domestic magnesium producers, Magcorp and Northwest Alloys, internally
consume some of the magnesium they produce.
29. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 11-12. Northwest Alloys, for example, internally
transfers its pure magnesium production to Alcoa, its corporate parent, for the manufacture
of aluminum. I&i
30. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
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Uruguay Round Agreements Act that amended U.S. domestic trade
law and created the "sunset review."" The fifth section of this
Note introduces the case study of Magnesium from Canada. In
particular, this section critiques the ITC's analysis during the
sunset review of the AD and CVD orders on magnesium from
Canada in light of prior case law and the legislative intent of the
URAA. This section also proposes alternative interpretations of the
legal standards established for sunset reviews, suggesting that the
AD and CVD orders on magnesium from Canada should have been
terminated.34
IMPORTANCE OF MAGNESIUM
In addition to illustrating the ITC's flawed analysis, the case
study of magnesium provides for a discussion of how magnesium is
poised to revolutionize the automobile manufacturing industry.
Although the standards applied by the ITC are extremely important
in the context of international trade, the importance of magnesium
metal itself should also be highlighted. Given the strict emissions
standards with which auto manufacturers must comply, automobile
manufacturers constantly strive to minimize the weight of their
vehicles. The ability of auto manufacturers to replace aluminum
parts with those made of magnesium is exactly why magnesium is
so highly valued. General Motors and Ford both plan to incorporate
a greater percentage of magnesium into their automobiles,
especially their SUVs, in the near future.3 5 These lighter-weight
vehicles will require less gasoline, thereby reducing auto emissions
and enhancing the overall air quality.
The realization of these environmental benefits, however,
depends on the reliability and quality of the magnesium supply.
Although magnesium is the third most abundant mineral on earth,
the extraction, purification, and manufacturing processes are
extremely fragile."6 Given the sensitivities of the manufacturing
process of magnesium, the ITC's determination not only prevented
33. See infra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 88-158 and accompanying text.
35. Ball, supra note 19, at A4.
36. Gerald Metals Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 718-19 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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the removal of the AD and CBD orders on magnesium from Canada,
it also complicated the procurement of magnesium for American
manufacturers, and has placed automobile manufacturers' archi-
tectural visions on hold.
SOURCES OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: SUBSIDIZATION AND DUMPING
To better understand the mechanics of AD and CVD orders it is
helpful to examnine the rationale for imposing such barriers on
imports. It is well-established that AD and CVD laws are remedial
in nature."7 The purpose of such laws is "to equalize competitive
conditions between the exporter and American industries af-
fected." 8
When a foreign product is subsidized 9 or dumped, 0 the domestic
product with which it competes is disadvantaged by virtue of the
import's artificially lower price. To counteract the effects of these
practices, the United States imposes duties on foreign products to
proportionately compensate for the disadvantage created by the
dumping or subsidization."1
In a simplified analysis, subsidization demands a remedy because
a subsidy provides a tangible economic advantage for a foreign
producer, which in turn can be passed along to consumers in the
form of lower prices. Similarly, the dumping of imports demands a
remedial because, by definition, dumping involves artificially
37. See e.g., National Knitwear & Sportswear Assn. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l. Trade
548, 558 (1991) (stating that "[as the courts have long recognized, the antidumping law is
a remedial statute").
38. Imbert Imports, Inc. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 n.10 (1971).
39. Subsidization refers to payments or favorable programs provided by a government
to a producer. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In turn, such subsidies theoretically
reduce the costs of production or exportation of the product, thereby enabling the producer
to sell its goods at a relatively lower price than unsubsidized goods. Common examples of
subsidization include providing favorable rates for utilities, such as electricity and water,
employee training programs, and beneficial loan programs.
40. "Dumping" is a phrase commonly used to describe the practice whereby a product is
sold at a price lower than its fair value. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677(34) (2000); see also supra
note 10 and accompanying text. When a foreign manufacturer sells a product in the United
States at a lower price than that for which it is sold in its country of origin, the product is
characterized as being "dumped" in the foreign market.
41. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a) (issuing countervailing duty order); id. § 1673e(a) (issuing
antidumping order); BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-1, at 492.
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reducing prices in order to compete with domestically manufactured
products. Ultimately, imports that are dumped or subsidized can
harm the domestic industry by decreasing the domestic products'
volume of sales or forcing the price of domestically manufactured
goods downward, thus reducing profits. When domestic manu-
facturers demonstrate that they have harmed by either dumping or
subsidization, AD and CVD duties are intended to create a "fair"
market in which U.S. domestic industries can continue to compete.
Petitions, Investigations, and Orders: The Respective Roles of the
Department of Commerce and the International Trade
Commission in AD and CVD Cases
Although the practices of dumping and subsidization are
mechanically very different, the standards used to establish AD
and CVD orders are quite similar.42 The Tariff Act of 1930 (Tariff
Act)' created the administrative petitioning process through
which U.S. domestic producers can obtain relief from unfair
trading practices through the imposition of AD or CVD orders on
imported goods." AD and CVD cases are complex due to the
involvement of both Commerce and the ITC in the administrative
review process.' 5 Given the complexities involved in AD and CVD
cases, it is essential to trace the evolution of a typical case, from its
initiation to its conclusion and the imposition of an order." Under
42. David A. Gantz,A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in
the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 120-31 (1995). Given the procedural
similarities, for the purposes of this overview it is proper to combine the discussion of AD and
CVD cases.
43. TariffAct of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) (antidumping duty orders); id. § 1673a(a) (countervailing duty
orders).
45. Id. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a).
46. For a comprehensive discussion of the "life cycle" of AD and CVD cases, see BHALA
& KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-1, at 489-500. Bhala divides the cases into ten steps:
i. Filing an Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Petition
ii. The Department of Commerce's Determination on the Sufficiency ofthe Petition
iii. The ITC's Preliminary Injury Determination
iv. Commerce's Preliminary Dumping Margin or Subsidy Determination
v. Commerce's Final Dumping Margin or Subsidy Determination
vi. The ITC's Final Injury Determination
2160 [Vol. 43:2151
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the Tariff Act, AD and CVD cases begin either at the initiative of
the Department of Commerce'7 or upon petition by a domestic
industry,48 provided the petitioner qualifies as an "interested
party."49 Although Commerce has the authority to initiate inves-
tigations absent a petition, the majority of investigations are
initiated in response to petitions filed by American companies. 50
Once Commerce determines that the petition is sufficient on its
face,5 the investigation phase begins.
Given the remedial nature of antidumping and countervailing
duty laws,52 justifying the creation and continued existence of AD
and CVD orders requires two separate findings.5" First, there must
vii. Commerce's Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order
viii. Judicial Appeals or NAFTA Panel Review of an Antidumping or Countervailing
Duty Order
ix. Administrative Reviews of an Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order
x. Addressing Circumvention of an Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order
Id- at 494-95.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) (authorizing Commerce to initiate countervailing duty
investigations); id. § 1673a(a)(1) (authorizing Commerce to initiate antidumping
investigations).
48. Id. § 1671a(b) (authorizing domestic producers to initiate countervailing duty
investigations); id. § 1673a(b) (authorizing domestic producers to initiate antidumping
investigations). Parties file petitions simultaneously with Commerce and the ITC. Id. §
1671a(b)(2) (filing of countervailing duty petitions); id. § 1673a(B)(2) (filing antidumping
petitions).
49. Only "interested parties" have standing to file AD and CVD petitions. Id. §§
1671a(b)(1), 1673a(b)(1). A simplified definition of an "interested party" is "one who acts by
or'on behalfof' the allegedly affected United States industry." BHALA& KENNEDY, supra note
3, § 5-2(b)(1), at 501 (citation omitted). For the detailed statutory definition of who qualifies
as an "interested party" see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9).
50. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-2(b), at 500.
51. A petition is sufficient if it (1) alleges the necessary elements to impose a duty, (2)
contains reasonably available information, and (3) is filed by or on behalf of an interested
party. Id § 5-1, at 498.
52. See supra notes 37-38.
53. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-1, at 490-92. A countervailing duty shall be
imposed on merchandise when Commerce
determines that the government of a country or any public entity within the
territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable
subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a class or kind
of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the
United States, and... the Commission determines that (A) an industry in the
United States (i)is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material injury,
or (B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially
retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise ....
19 U.S.C. § 1671(aX1)-(2). Similarly, an antidumping duty shallbe imposed when Commerce
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be a finding of dumping or subsidization of imports. Second, there
must be a finding of harm ("material injury" or "threat of material
injury") to the domestic industry.' The responsibility for these
two determinations is divided between Commerce and the ITC.55
Commerce is responsible for the dumping or subsidy determi-
nation,5" and the ITC assumes responsibility for the injury
determination." If both Commerce and the ITC make affirmative
determinations, the statute directs Commerce to impose AD or CVD
orders.58
It is important to note that the "material injury" determination
itself consists of two separate findings. Not only must the ITC find
that the domestic industry is harmed, it must be shown that the
subject imports caused the injury." Therefore, if evidence of
determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to
be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and the Commission
determines that (A) an industry in the United States (i) is materially injured,
or (ii) is threatened with material injury, or (B) the establishment of an
industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of
that merchandise ....
Id. § 1673(1)-(2). See infra notes 109-58 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
material injury and causation standards applied during sunset reviews. See also Gerald
Metals, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 716, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
54. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (requiring a material injury determination by the ITC
regarding subsidies); id. § 1673b(a) (requiring a material injury determination by the ITC
regarding dumping); see also Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 719.
55. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-1, at 490-92.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (requiring a countervailable subsidy determination by
Commerce); id. § 1673 (requiring a dumping determination by Commerce).
57. Id. § 1671b(a) (requiring a material injury determination by the ITC regarding
subsidies); id. § 1673b(a) (requiring a material injury determination by the ITC regarding
dumping). Material injury is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant." Id. § 1677(7)(A). In its analysis to determine whether imports have caused
material injury to the domestic industry the ITC shall consider-
(I) the volume of imports of the subject merchandise, (II) the effect of imports
of that merchandise on prices in the United States for domestic like products,
and (III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of
domestic like products, but only in the context of production operations within
the United States.
Id. § 1677(7)(B)(i). In addition, the ITC is given the discretion to consider "other economic
factors as are relevant to the determination regarding whether there is material injury by
reason of imports." Id. § 1671(7)(B)(ii).
58. Id. § 167le(a) (issuingcountervailingdutyorder); id. § 1673e(a) (issuingantidumping
order); BHAIA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-1, at 492.
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(1) (identifying the causation standard for countervailable
subsidy investigations); id. § 1673d(b)(1) (identifying the causation standard for dumping
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causation is lacking, the ITC cannot make an affirmative
determination of material injury.60 Ultimately, harm to the
domestic industry alone, without ample evidence that the subject
imports caused such harm, is insufficient to impose or prolong AD
or CVD orders.6'
Removal of AD and CVD Orders: Traditional Appeal Mechanisms
and Annual Administrative Reviews
As noted previously, the duration of AD and CVD orders is not
predetermined and, unfortunately for foreign producers, the
removal of AD and CVD orders traditionally has been an arduous
and lengthy process.62 The endurance of AD and CVD orders is not
due to the lack of appeal mechanisms, but rather is attributable in
part to the unavailability of certain mechanisms to private parties
and the strict standards of review applied during such appeals.
The imposition of AD and CVD orders by Commerce can be
appealed via several different channels, including the Court of
International Trade, NAFTA binational panels, and WTO panels. 63
As private parties, foreign producers can appeal Commerce's
decision immediately to the Court of International Trade (CIT).6'
investigations). The statute directs the ITC to "make a final determination ofwhether--(A)
an industry in the United States (i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material
injury... by reason ofimports .... Id. (emphasis added). See also Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d
at 719.
60. Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 719-20. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, "fain afirmative injury determination requires both (1) present material injury and
(2) a finding that the material injury is 'by reason of the subject imports. Hence, the anti-
dumping statute mandates a showing of causal-not merely temporal-connection between
the LTFV goods and the material injury." Id. (citation omitted).
61. Id.
62. See supra note 13. It is estimated that prior to the Uruguay Round, Commerce
removed only thirty percent of the 533 antidumping and countervailing duty orders
established between 1980 and 1994; during the same time period, AD and CVD orders
remained in effect on average 8.28 years before being revoked. See BHALA& KENNEDYsupra
note 3, § 5-10(c)(1), at 628 (citing Barbara R. Stafford & Linda S. Chang, The Sunset
Provisions, Mortality and the Uruguay Round, in ITHE COt=ERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 721, 727 n.12 (1994).
63. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-9(a), at 603-08.
64. Id. at 603-04 (discussing the procedural requirements of appeal to the CIT and the
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the CIT over antidumping and countervailing duty
matters); see also Gantz, supra note 40, at 120-31. Decisions of the CIT may then be appealed
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In reviewing agency decisions, however, the CIT is mandated to
give extraordinary deference to the final determinations of
Commerce and the ITC.65 The CIT, therefore, cannot re-evaluate
factual findings and cannot overturn the imposition of an order
unless the determination by Commerce or the ITC is "arbitrary and
capricious" or is not supported by "substantial evidence."6 Even if
the CIT disagrees with Commerce's findings, the CIT overturns
very few AD and CVD decisions due to the strict standards of
review it must apply to prior agency determinations.67
In addition to the appellate mechanisms within the U.S. domestic
judicial system, both NAFTA and GAT provide dispute resolution
forums in which foreign producers can challenge AD and CVD
orders.6" Although these international treaties provide alternative
appeal mechanisms, they are available to private producers only to
the extent that the countries from which they export are parties to
the treaties.69 Moreover, under GATT only sovereign member states
have standing to submit matters to the Dispute Settlement Body of
the WTO.70 Thus, for a foreign producer to take advantage of the
appellate mechanism provided in the WTO, the producer must
convince his own national government to file an appeal on his
behalf.7
1
Traditionally, if these appeal mechanisms failed and the
imposition of the duties were upheld, the foreign producer had the
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and thereafter to the Supreme Court.
BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-9(a), at 603; Gantz, supra note 42, at 120-25.
65. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-9(a), at 606.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 5-9(b), at 606-15 (discussing the binational review panel procedure under
NAFTA); id. § 5-9(c), at 615-20 (discussing the appellate procedure under the WTO). Under
NAFTA, the binational review process can begin only after a final determination by
Commerce and can only be initiated by an interested party, who was also a party to the
underlying case, by filing a formal request for a review with the United States Secretary. See
id. § 5-9(b), at 608; see also Gantz, supra note 42, at 120 (stating that "mechanisms provided
under NAFTA and the World Trade Organization... afford governments ... the opportunity
to challenge, or be challenged with regard to, governmental trade actions that are alleged to
be violations of the provisions of NAFTA or the WTO agreements").
69. Under NAFTA, for example, only producers from those nations that are parties to the
treaty (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) can submit an appeal to a binational panel.
BHAIA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-9(b)(2), at 610.
70. Gantz, supra note 42, at 131.
71. Id.
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burden of requesting annual reviews with Commerce in the hope
that after several years the very same regulatory agency that
initially imposed the orders would eventually revoke them.72
SUNSET REVIEWS: A NEW PHENOMENON
During the Uruguay Round, exporting nations vehemently voiced
their objections to the United States' lack of mandatory and
automatic reviews of existing AD and CVD orders.73 The United
States and other importing nations yielded to the demands of
exporters by agreeing to conduct mandatory and automatic reviews
of AD and CVD orders no later than five years after publication and
to terminate such orders unless the agency conducting the review
determines that both the injury and dumping or subsidization are
likely to continue or reoccur.74 With the enactment of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act in 1994, the United States amended its
trade laws to include these mandatory and automatic "sunset
reviews" of AD and CVD orders.75
Foreign producers whose products were subject to AD and CVD
orders were understandably encouraged by the fact that sunset
reviews were automatic and mandatory. Such elation on the part of
foreign producers, however, was tempered by the inclusion of a
broad exception to the language concerning mandatory termination
of orders.76 Thus, even after the sunset review came into existence,
72. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-10, at 620-28; 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(A) (2000)
(reviewing of CVD orders); id. § 1675(a)(1)(B) (review of AD orders).
73. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-10(c)(1), at 629.
74. Id.; Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Apr. 15,1994, MarrakeshAgreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND voL 33, art. 11:3,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, art. 21:3,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(1)(A). According to the statute,
5 years after the date of the publication of-(A) a countervailing duty order...
[and] an antidumping duty order.... [Commerce and the ITC] shall conduct a
review to determine, in accordance with section 1675a of this title, whether
revocation of the countervailing or antidumping duty order... would be likely
to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy
(as the case may be) and of material injury.
Id. See also BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-10(c)(2), at 629-30.
76. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-10(c)(1), at 629.
20021 2165
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
two important questions remained: (1) what legal standards would
apply to sunset reviews, and (2) how would Commerce and the ITO
interpret these legal standards? The answers to both of these
questions reveal that, in practice, sunset reviews have neither
produced meaningful change in the U.S. trade regulations nor
provided foreign producers with any substantial import duty relief.
Statutory Language Mandating Termination of Orders
A sunset review closely resembles an initial AD or CVD inves-
tigation with respect to the required agency determinations and the
division of responsibilities between Commerce and the ITC.
Commerce is responsible for assessing whether the subsidization or
dumping is likely to continue or reoccur77 and the ITO is responsible
for the injury determination.7" In a sunset review, once Commerce
determines that the response from domestic parties is sufficient,79
Commerce and the ITC begin their investigations.
Simply stated, Commerce is directed to revoke an AD or CVD
order except in two circumstances. 0 If Commerce determines
that revocation of an order is likely to lead to the continuation
or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy or dumping, the order
must not be revoked.8 ' Commerce is also directed not to revoke
the order if the ITO makes a final determination that such revo-
cation is likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of material
injury.82 Failure to revoke an order, therefore, can only be justified
if Commerce finds that the dumping or subsidization will likely
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(b) (Commerce's determination of the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence of a countervailable subsidy upon revocation); id. § 1675a(c) (Commerce's
determination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping upon revocation).
78. Id. § 1675a(a)(1) (ITC's determination of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence
of material injury upon revocation).
79. Commerce must revoke an AD or CVD order if, within ninety days after notice of
initiation of the sunset review, no interested domestic party responds to the notice of
initiation. Id. § 1675(c)(3).
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continue or reoccur if the order is revoked and if the ITC finds that
material injury will likely continue or reoccur upon revocation.83
Burdens of Proof in a Sunset Review
Perhaps one of the more anticipated changes created by the
sunset review provision was the shift in the burden of proof from
the foreign producer to the domestic industry. 4 Prior to the sunset
reviews, foreign producers had the burden of proving the dis-
continuation of dumping and subsidization as well as the absence
of material injury.' Given the tremendous difficulties associated
with proving the absence of injury to the U.S. domestic industry,
few foreign producers were able to successfully challenge AD and
CVD orders during annual administrative reviews.8" Now, under
the sunset review mandate, the domestic industry has the burden
of proving that either dumping or a subsidy is likely to reoccur or
continue and that material injury to the domestic industry likely
will result if the order is revoked. If the domestic industry fails in
its burden of proof or fails to participate in the sunset review, AD
and CVD orders will be revoked.
On its face, the statutory language of the sunset review shifted
the burden of proof, which suggested that a greater percentage
of AD and CVD orders would be revoked. In practice, however,
the burden never really shifted because Commerce and the ITC
adopted regulations allowing them to rely upon calculations from
83. Id. Commerce must "revoke an antidumping duty or countervailing duty order in a
five-year ('sunset!) review unless Commerce determines that dumping or a countervailable
subsidy would be likely to continue or reoccur and the [ITC] determines that material injury
would be likely to continue or recur within a reasonably foreseeable time." Thelma J. Askey,
Dissenting Views, in MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 27 (referring to the statutory provision
found in 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)).
84. BHAI A& KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-10(c)(2), at 630 n.666 (acknowledging that the
Uruguay Round AD and SCM Agreements shifted the burden of proof from the respondent
to Commerce).
85. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing foreign producers' reliance on
annual adminitrative reviews to seek removal of AD and CVD orders).
86. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the rate of removal and the
average durations of AD and CVD orders).
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their original investigations to evaluate the likelihood of future
behavior.8
7
CASE STUDY: MAGNESIUM FROM CANADA
In 1992, Commerce imposed anAD order on pure magnesium and
CVD orders on pure and alloy magnesium."8 Pursuant to the sunset
review statute, the ITC began its five-year review of these orders in
August of 1999.9 At the conclusion of the sunset review in July
2000, the Commissioners of the ITC determined that revocation of
the AD and CVD orders would likely lead to a continuation or
recurrence of material injury to the domestic industry.90 As such,
the AD and CVD orders remained firmly intact, much to the dismay
of automobile manufacturers and other industrial users of
magnesium.
As noted above, magnesium is highly valued by automobile
manufacturers who envision using magnesium automobile
components in the future to meet strict vehicle emissions
standards.91 At present, however, the domestic magnesium
industry is unable to meet the demand for magnesium.92 Moreover,
87. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 3, § 5-10(c)(2), at 631.
88. Pure Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 31,1992)
(antidumping duty order); Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed.
Reg. 39,392 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 31, 1992) (countervailing duty order); see also infra notes
94-106 (discussing Commerce and the ITC's original AD and CVD investigations of
magnesium from Canada).
89. The orders reviewed during the Magnesium from Canada sunset review included
both CVD and AD orders on pure magnesium and a CVD order on alloy magnesium. The
original determination by the Commission from August 1992, Magnesium from Canada, 57
Fed. Reg. 38,696 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Aug. 26, 1992) (determination) (announcing INT'L
TRADE COMM'N, MAGNESIUM FROM CANADA INVESTIGATIONS Nos. 701-TA-309 AND 731-TA-
528 (FINAL) (1992) (USITC Pub. No. 2550)), was challenged by the respondents before a
United States-Canada Binational Panel. This challenge focused primarily on the
classification of pure and alloy magnesium as one industry rather than as two separate and
distinct industries. See MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 3-4. On remand from the Binational
Panel, the Commission based its determination on the existence of two separate industries.
Id. at 3. It is important to note this Commission's recognition of alloy magnesium and pure
magnesium as two distinct industries for the purposes of captive production analysis.
90. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 2.
91. See supra notes 19 and 35-36 and accompanying text.
92. Thelma J. Askey, Dissenting Views, in MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 30.
Commissioner Askey acknowledged in her dissent that in 1999, even if the U.S. domestic
industry had operated at full capacity, it would have been unable to satisfy the total demand
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as acknowledged by General Motors and Northern Diecast
Corporation, the domestic demand for magnesium would be even
greater ifthe quantity and quality ofmagnesium were more reliable
(i.e., if the orders on Canadian magnesium were revoked).93
Original Determinations
Prior to analyzing the sunset review conducted in 2000, it is
essential to explore the original investigations and determinations
to better understand the rationale for imposing these AD and CVD
orders on magnesium from Canada in the first place. In September
1991, Magcorp, a domestic producer of pure and-alloy magnesium,
9 4
filed AD and CVD petitions with Commerce and the ITC.95 In its
petitions, Magcorp alleged that the imports of magnesium from
Canada injured or threatened injury to the domestic magnesium
industry" by virtue of dumping and producers' receipt of subsidies
from the Canadian and Quebecios governments." In 1991, Norsk
Hydro Canada, Inc. (NHCI) and Timminco Limited were the only
two magnesium producers in Canada. 98
for alloy and pure magnesium. Id.
93. GM and Northern Diecast Corporation are industrial users of alloy magnesium and
filed briefs supporting revocation of the orders on Canadian magnesium. MAGNESIUM, supra
note 19, at 4 n.13.
94. On remand, the ITC recognized that pure magnesium and alloy magnesium
constituted two separate industries. Id. at 3.
95. Pure andAlloyMagnesium From Canada, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,743 (Dep't Commerce Oct.
1, 1991) (initiation) (antidumping investigation); Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada,
56 Fed. Reg. 49,747 (Dep't Commerce Oct. 1, 1991) (initiation) (countervailing duty
investigation); Magnesium From Canada and Norway;, Investigations Nos. 701-TA-309 and
731-TA-528 and 529 (preliminary), 56 Fed. Reg. 55,930 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Oct. 30, 1991)
(determination).
96. In 1992, the U.S. magnesium industry consisted of three producers: Magcorp,
Northwest Alloys and Dow Chemical. Northwest Alloys did not advocate imposition of orders
because they did not compete in the merchant market. See supra notes 22-27 and
accompanying text (discussing captive production). Dow exited the industry in 1998.
MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 11.
97. See sources cited supra note 95.
98. See Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,946 (Dep't
Commerce July 13, 1992) (determination).
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With respect to the countervailable subsidy allegation, both
Commerce and the ITC made affirmative determinations.99 In its
investigation, Commerce found that three of the seventeen
programs originally identified in Magcorp's petition conferred
countervailable benefits to NHCI."'0 These programs included the
exemption from payment of water bills, preferential electric rates,
and grants from the Quebec Industrial Development Corporation. 10'
In its material injury determination, the ITC found that the
subsidized production of magnesium from Canada injured the
domestic industry.112
In its antidumping investigation, Commerce found that pure
magnesium from Canada was being dumped or was likely to be
dumped, but dismissed the petition with respect to alloy magne-
sium because it determined that there was insufficient evidence to
support the dumping allegation. 3 The ITC then determined that
the domestic magnesium industry was materially injured by
dumped imports of pure magnesium. 4
In July 1992, at the conclusion of the investigations and pursuant
to its statutory authority, Commerce issued a CVD order on
magnesium from Canada at a margin for NHCI of 21.61% and an
all-others rate of 21.61% but excluded Timminco from the CVD
orders because Timminco did not receive any benefits from these
programs. 05 With respect to pure magnesium, Commerce issued an
99. Id. (describing Commerce determination); Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg.
38,696 (Intl Trade Comm'n Aug. 26, 1992) (determination) (describing ITC determination).
100. Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 30,946.
101. Id. at 30,948 to 30,950.
102. Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,696. For a complete discussion of the
views of the ITC see Determinations of the Commission, in INTL TRADE COMM'N, supra note
89.
103. Pure andAlloy Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,939 (Dep't Commerce July
13, 1992) (determination) (announcing findings and rescinding alloy magnesium
investigation).
104. See Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 38,696.
105. Pure Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 31,1992)
(antidumping duty order); Pure Magnesium and Alloy Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed.
Reg. 39,'392 (Dep't Commerce Aug. 31, 1992) (countervailing duty order); Pure Magnesium
and Alloy Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. at 30,946 (announcing CVD margins).
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AD order on pure magnesium at a margin of 31.33% for NHCI,
31.33% for all others, and 0% for TiMMinco.
10 6
SUNSET REVIEW OF AD AND CVD ORDERS
In response to its request for participation in the sunset reviews
involving magnesium from Canada, Commerce received responses
from three respondent interested parties, NHCI, the Government
of Canada, and the Gouvernement du Quebec (GOQ), and from one
domestic interested party, Magcorp.' 7 Based on the sufficiency of
these responses, Commerce launched a full sunset review."'
Legal Standard of Review: "Likelihood" of Continuation or
Recurrence of Material Injury
Following Commerce's affirmative determination, the ITC found
that the revocation of the AD and CVD orders would likely lead to
a continuation or recurrence of material injury to the domestic
industry.0 9 Interestingly, the ITC based a substantial part of its
material injury determination on the activity of a new Canadian
company named Magnola, rather than on the activities of NHCI,
upon whom the orders were originally imposed."0 Therefore, to
properly critique the ITC's reliance on the future potential
production of Magnola in its determinations, it is necessary to first
discuss the legal standard of review to be applied during sunset
reviews.
The amended statute directs both Commerce and the ITC to
employ a "likelihood" standard to invoke the exception to the
mandatory termination of orders.' In relevant part, the statute
106. See sources cited supra note 105; Pure and Alloy Magnesium From Canada, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 30,939 (announcing AD margins).
107. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 4.
108. Magnesium From Canada, 64 Fed. Reg. 41,961 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 1999)
(initiation) (announcing five-year reviews of the applicable CVD and AD orders).
109. MAGNESIl, supra note 19, at 2. Commissioner Askey dissented with respect to the
CVD orders, finding instead that the revocation of the CVD orders on pure and alloy
magnesium was not likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of material injury. Id. at
27-36.
110. Id. at 12-19.
111. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)(1) (2000).
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states that Commerce and the ITC "shall conduct a review to
determine ... whether revocation of the countervailing or
antidumping duty order... would be likely to lead to continuation
or recurrence of dumping or a countervailable subsidy ... and of
material injury. " 112 In light of the legislative guidance provided
by the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA),"' the ITC inter-
preted the "likelihood" standard to be "prospective in nature.""4 The
SAA, however, also limited the temporal application of the
"likelihood" standard.'15 Based on the SAA, any prospective analysis
in which the ITC engages must not extend beyond a "reasonably
foreseeable time.'" 6 The SAA further noted that a "reasonably
foreseeable time" will normally exceed the "imminent" standard
applied during AD and CVD investigations."'
Defining the Likely Volume of Subject Imports
During a sunset review, to assess the existence and cause of
harm to the domestic industry, the ITC must "consider the likely
volume, price effect, and impact of imports of the subject
merchandise on the industry [within the reasonably foreseeable
future] if the order is revoked 118 in the sunset review of
magnesium from Canada, the ITC found that Canadian producers
were capable of substantially increasing imports to the United
States. In large part, however, the ITC's determination stemmed
from its inclusion of the prospective volumes of magnesium
production from Magnola in calculating the likely volume of
subject imports."1 Yet the legitimacy of the ITC's inclusion of
Magnola's potential production capacity depends upon whether
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. COMMrTrEONWAYSAND MEANS, STATEMENT OFADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. Doc.
No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 883 (1994).
114. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 7.
115. H.R. DOC. No. 103-316, at 883.
116. Id. at 887. According to the SAA, the likelihood standard calls upon the ITC to
.engage in a counter-factual analysis: it must decide the likely impact in the reasonably
foreseeable future of an important change in the status quo" upon revocation of the order.
Id. at 884.
117. Id. at 887.
118. 19 U.S.C. § 1675a(a)(1) (2000).
119. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 13.
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such production falls within the reasonably foreseeable future." °
Even if the temporal standard is satisfied, the ITC must still
analyze whether Magnola will ship magnesium in such quantities
to the U.S. that the subject imports cause the material injury.
Although at the time of the sunset review Magnola had not yet
begun to make magnesium in commercial quantities,' 21 the ITC
justified including Magnola's future production capacity in its
calculations by describing the entry of Magnola in the magnesium
industry as "imminent." 22 In the ITC's opinion, the "imminence" of
Magnola's production satisfied the reasonably foreseeable time
frame, and therefore the ITC could include the potential pro-
duction capacity of Magnola in its material injury evaluation.12 As
recognized by Commissioner Askey, however, "[tihere is only one
subject Canadian producer currently producing ... magnesium in
commercial quantities: NHCI."24 Nonetheless, the ITC included the
speculative production volume of Magnola in its calculation of the
potential volume of Canadian imports.
Despite the statutory permissibility of looking beyond the
imminent future, the ITC's inclusion of the volume of potential
magnesium production at least two years from fruition runs
contrary to the legislative intent of AD and CVD orders, and
especially sunset reviews. Congress established AD and CVD orders
to create a level playing field for domestic producers who compete
with foreign manufacturers that engage in unfair trading
practices."2 By their definition alone, AD and CVD orders are not
intended to be prospective. They exist to punish foreign producers
for past behavior, rather than to preemptively police foreign
manufacturers by imposing duties in anticipation that they may
dump or receive subsidies.
120. Id. at 13-16. By its own estimates, Magnola expects to reach full capacity of 63,000
metric tons of magnesium in 2002. Id. at 30. The ITC itself noted that 'the additional
available capacity attributable to Magnola by itself indicates that Canadian producers have
the capability to increase significantly their shipments ... to the United States." Id. at 13.
121. Id at 12-13.
122. Id. at 12.
123. Id. at 12-13.
124. Thelma J. Askey, Dissenting Views, in MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 30 (emphasis
added). Commissioner Askey noted that Timminco is another current Canadian producer,
yet is not subject to the orders. Id. at 30 n.205.
125. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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The sunset review provision was intended to discontinue AD and
CVD orders when the justifications for their original imposition no
longer exist. Magnola did not exist in 1992 when the AD and CVD
orders were imposed. The ITC's use of Magnola's potential
production capacity as one of the primary justifications for
extending the AD and CVD orders is therefore logically flawed.
Moreover, the extension of the orders had the practical effect of
conveniently bypassing the need for Magcorp to petition Commerce
and the ITC to conduct the statutorily required investigations if
Magnola were to engage in unfair trade practices.'26 If Magnola
dumps or receives countervailable subsidies in the future, Magcorp
can petition Commerce and the ITC to commence AD and CVD
investigations. 12 7 It is this petitioning process described in detail
above, not the sunset review of pre-existing orders, that is the
appropriate means by which Magcorp should seek relief, if such
relief is warranted.
Improper Causation Standard and Failure of the ITC to
Adequately Consider Fairly Traded Nonsubject Imports
The second error of the ITC during the sunset review of
Magnesium from Canada involved its failure to fully evaluate
the impact of low-priced nonsubject imports from third-party
countries in its material injury analysis in light of the causation
standard established in Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States.' In
Gerald Metals, the ITC originally determined that LTFV imports of
magnesium from China, Russia, and the Ukraine injured the U.S.
industry. 9 The domestic importer, named Gerald Metals, appealed
the ITC's decision to the CIT; the CIT upheld the ITC's injury
determination.' The CAFC vacated the CIT's decision, however,
because the ITC failed to incorporate the presence of fairly traded
126. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
127. Id. (detailing the administrative petitioning process through which domestic
producers may obtain relief from unfair imports).
128. 132 F.3d 716, 719 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
129. Id. at 717 (citing Magnesium From China, Russia, and Ukraine, 60 Fed. Reg. 26,456
(Int'l Trade Comm'n May 17, 1995) (determination)).
130. Id. (citing Gerald Metals, Inc. v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 930, 942 (Ct. Intl Trade
1996)).
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imports into its causation analysis under the erroneous belief that
minimal harm caused by unfairly traded imports alone satisfied the
material injury causation requirement.' 31 Ultimately, the CAFC
reasoned that when both fairly and unfairly traded imports exist in
the same market and the domestic industry is harmed, the ITC
must conclusively establish that such harm is substantially caused
by the unfairly traded imports and not by the low-priced fairly
traded imports.12
As noted previously, 83 and as expressed by the CAFC, the
antidumping statute "requires the injury to occur by reason of' the
LTFV imports.""'3 The circuit court rejected the CIT's reasoning
that evidence of minimal or tangential causation of injury satisfies
the statutory causal requirement."3 5 The CAFC concluded that "the
statute requires adequate evidence to show that the harm occurred
'by reason of' the LTFV imports, not by reason of a minimal or
tangential contribution to material harm caused by LTFV goods."13 6
Thus, the decision of the circuit court in Gerald Metals establishes
that a showing of harm to the domestic industry which is caused
minimally by unfairly traded imports is insufficient to substantiate
the imposition of AD and CVD orders.' When injury to the
domestic market can be a "result of market forces other than unfair
trading,"' such as low-priced and fairly traded imports, the ITC
must carefully distinguish between the harm caused by dumping
and subsidization, and that caused by normal market forces." 9
Based on Gerald Metals, if the injury caused by the subject
Canadian imports was minimal or tangential, the ITC could not
properly satisfy the causation standard. In the sunset review of
Magnesium from Canada, the ITC failed to isolate the harm attri-
butable to the Canadian imports from the harm attributable to
131. Id. at 723.
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanyingtext (outliningthe two partmaterialinjury
test).
134. Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 722.
135. Id. (stating that "evidence of de minimus (e.g., minimal or tangential) causation of
injury does not reach the causation level required under the statute").
136. Id.
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imports from third-party countries. Although the ITC recognized
the presence of such low-priced nonsubject imports from countries
other than Canada, 40 it did not engage in any further consideration
of the fairly traded imports as part of its causation inquiry. In
Gerald Metals, the CAFC clearly identified the scope of the
remedial intent of AD and CVD orders. "While the statute protects
domestic magnesium producers from injury caused by LTFV
imports, its scope of protection does not reach so far as to support
artificially inflated prices when fairly-traded imports are under-
selling the domestic product .... " Without an assessment of the
comparative degrees to which subject versus nonsubject imports
caused injury to the U.S. industry, the ITC erred in concluding that
upon revocation of the orders the subject Canadian imports would
harm the U.S. industry.
Problems in Defining the Domestic Industry
To evaluate whether revocation of the AD and CVD orders would
likely lead to a continuation or recurrence of material injury to the
domestic market, the ITC must also define the scope of the domestic
industry and identify the market participants.'42 In sunset reviews,
the ITC "'makes determinations by weighing all of the available
evidence regarding a multiplicity of factors relating to the domestic
industry as a whole ..... " The ITC has interpreted this statutory
language to include as part of the domestic industry any and all
producers of the like product, even if the like product is captively
consumed.' Therefore, despite Northwest Alloys' substantial
140. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 12.
141. Gerald Metals, 132 F.3d at 722.
142. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 6.
143. Id. at 8 (quoting COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316; vol. 1, at 886 (1994)). The statute defines "industry" as "the
producers as a whole of a domestic like product, or those producers whose collective output
of a domestic like product constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of
the product." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (2000). In evaluating what constitutes a "domestic like
product" the ITC does not rely upon any one single factor. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 6
n.29. Rather, the ITC generally considers several factors in its analysis including physical
characteristics, uses, interchangeability, channels of distribution, consumer perceptions, and
price. Id.
144. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 7.
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captive production of magnesium, the ITC used both Northwest
Alloys and Magcorp to calculate the capacity and capacity utili-
zation of the U.S. magnesium industry.'45
The underlying premise of the theory of captive production is that
imported goods do not compete with those materials that are
essentially used as inputs in the manufacturing of downstream end
products." 6 Whereas the domestic like product that is sold in the
open market may be disadvantaged by unfairly traded imports, the
internally consumed domestic like product, by virtue of its captivity,
cannot be injured by fluctuations in the volume or price of
imports."7 To accurately gauge the extent to which the subject
imports injured the U.S. industry, therefore, it seems reasonable
that only those domestic products that are sold in the merchant
market, and thus compete directly with the imported products,
should be considered by the ITC in its material injury analysis.
The ITC does recognize the dilemma presented by the issue of
captive production."' As noted by Commissioner Askey, "subject
imports do not compete with captive production of domestic
merchandise in the same way that they compete with domestic
production sold in the merchant market."" 9 Commissioner Askey
acknowledged that, "[w]bile the subject imports may arguably have
some indirect effect on captive domestic production as a result of
competition in downstream markets, any competitive price or
volume effects between the subject imports and captive domestic
consumption is attenuated, at best."'50
The statute directs the ITC, in its material injury analysis, to
focus primarily on the merchant market and to exclude captive
production data from its material injury analysis in certain
circumstances.' In the sunset review of Magnesium from Canada,
145. Id.
146. Id. at 12 n.76.
147. Id.
148. Chung, supra note 1, at 512-13.
149. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 12 n.76.
150. Id.
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7XC)(iv) (2000). The statute states, in relevant part, that:
If domestic producers internally transfer significant production of the domestic
like product for the production of a downstream article and sell significant
production of the domestic like product in the merchant market, and the
Commission finds that-
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however, the ITC strictly construed the aforementioned
qualifications.' 52 Three of the six Commissioners reasoned that the
second criterion was not met because, based on the cost share of the
pure magnesium in aluminum products, pure magnesium was not
a predominant input in the production of the captively produced
aluminum product. 5 ' Instead, the ITC merely considered "the
significant degree of captive production as a condition of
competition."'54 The ITC's strict statutory interpretation is not
consistent with the remedial intent of AD and CVD orders because
no remedy should be required for the portion of the domestic
production that is captively consumed.
The ITC's decision is even more perplexing when contrasted with
its decision regarding hot-rolled steel. The ITC applied a much
different standard in the investigation of hot-rolled steel imports in
1993.' In that investigation, the ITC found that the United States'
hot-rolled carbon steel industry'56 was not 00materially injured
nor threatened with material injury. "The ITC concluded that a
negative determination on injury was appropriate for all countries
since it found there was a lack of a causal nexus between the
subject imports and the industry's condition."157 The ITC's negative
determinations were based largely on the rationale that because a
"large percentage of domestic industry production was captively
(I) the domestic like product produced that is internally transferred for
processing into that downstream article does not enter the merchant market for
the domestic like product,
(II) the domestic like product is the predominant material input in the
production of that downstream article, and
(III) the production of the domestic like product sold in the merchant market
is not generally used in the production of that downstream article, then the
Commission, in determining market share and the factors affecting financial
performance set forth in clause (iii), shall focus primarily on the merchant
market for the domestic like product.
Id
152. MAGNESIUM, supra note 19, at 12 n.75.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 12 n.74.
155. CIT Affirms Negative Injury Rulings on Several Hot-Rolled Steel Decisions, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 189 (Jan. 25, 1995).
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consumed... that the industry was affected only minimally by the
subject imports."5 8
CONCLUSION
The analysis applied by the ITC in its sunset review of orders on
Magnesium from Canada is misguided in several respects. First,
the ITC expanded its statutory authority to consider developments
within a reasonably foreseeable time by including the future
production capacity of Magnola that is at least two years from
initial commercial production runs. The ITC also erred by not
distinguishing between harm to the domestic industry that was
caused by nonsubject third-party imports and that caused by
Canadian subject imports. Lastly, the ITC merely considered the
captive production of Northwest Alloys as a "condition of
competition" rather than excluding it entirely from its material
injury analysis and focusing primarily on the merchant market.
Given the legislative intent of AD and CVD to penalize past
misbehavior, the standards of review that the ITC applied during
the sunset review of Magnesium from Canada were grossly
misguided.
During the sunset review of Magnesium from Canada, the ITC
clearly expanded its already broad discretion to consider future
behavior by engaging in prospective analysis of Magnola. Despite
the inherent contradiction between the remedial intent of AD and
CVD orders and the extension of such orders based on a new
producer, it is highly unlikely that either Commerce or the ITC will
refrain from"prospective" analyses. Therefore, if Commerce and the
ITC wish to include potential producers in their determinations,
they must adopt corresponding regulations to restore and enhance
the legitimacy of sunset reviews.
Jennifer Karen King
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